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“it is obvious from the massive violence against civilian populations around 
the world today and throughout history that most warring parties do not see 
civilians as humanitarian agencies might like them to. Either they do not find 
civilians particularly innocent or they decide that, innocent or not, killing them 
is useful, necessary or inevitable in their wars.” Hugo Slim, Killing Civilians 
— Method, Madness and Morality in War, 2007 
 
1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Context 
 
In the Central African Republic (CAR), Muslim Séléka and Christian anti-balaka groups 
allegedly committed crimes against humanity and war crimes including murder, rape, forced 
displacement, persecution, pillaging, attacks against humanitarian missions and the use of children 
in combat. With thousands of deaths, over 300,000 people internally displaced and 2.3 million in 
need of humanitarian assistance, armed groups have caused destruction in their rebellious fight. In 
northern Mali, the Tuareg rebellion destroyed cultural shrines, committed rape and executed 
detainees triggering the French military operation Sangaris supported now by a 15,000 strong UN 
peacekeeping mission. Armed groups (sometimes government militias) have been involved in 
numerous war crimes in the Darfur region since 2003 with the UN estimating 300,000 deaths. Jan 
Egeland, the Emergency Relief Coordinator described Darfur as “the killing fields of our 
generation” (United Nations 2004). In eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), rebel groups 
are responsible for mass murder, summary execution, rape, forced displacement and the use of 
child soldiers. In Uganda, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is infamously known for its 
atrocities and impact on the civilians in northern Uganda. 
 The commonality between these rebel groups is that they all violated international norms 
and are, as of April 2017, investigated by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes, 
crimes against humanity or even genocide (International Criminal Court 2017). It is estimated that 
rebels killed over 97,000 civilians between 1989 and 2009, without counting collateral damage 
and other forms of violence such as rape and pillaging (Jo 2015). Those few examples demonstrate 
the extent to which rebel groups can be violent in civil conflict and the importance in trying to 
curb their violent behavior. In 2014, rebel groups are responsible almost 8,000 deaths in conflicts 
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in Africa with violence against civilians increasing for the first time in five years representing 35% 
of casualties (de Villiers 2015). 
 Engaging violent non-state actors in armed conflict has been taboo for a long time given 
the configuration of the world system today. Indeed, the Peace of Westphalia signed in 1648 
created a modern states system composed of sovereign nations. Yet, modern day conflicts differ 
from this classical perspective in which states are the only valued actors in the international system. 
In a multi-polar, multi-dimensional, multi-cultural international system, non-state armed actors 
(often labelled insurgents or rebels) have emerged as crucial players since most violent conflicts 
are contained within the boundaries of a state (Perrin 2012). Indeed, these intrastate conflicts, also 
labelled civil war and internal conflict, represent the vast majority of conflicts today and the sides 
fighting each other are often non-state actors (Smith 2006). 31 out of 32 conflicts were fought 
inside the boundaries of states in 2012 (Themnér and Wallensteen 2013) and the trend does not 
seem to be inversing in the following years, with internal conflicts flaring up in South Sudan, the 
Central African Republic, Yemen or Libya. SIPRI reports 50 conflicts in 2015, 49 of which are 
internal (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2016). These groups often fight for 
national independence, religious beliefs, economic gains, ethnicity, political or ideological ideas 
(Newman 2014). International laws and norms such as International Human Rights Law and 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) were originally designed for interstate wars with regular 
militaries and not for internal conflicts. In internal conflict, state authorities are often reluctant to 
engage in negotiation with rebels fearing that it would legitimize the group and their claims. Such 
conflicts often result in part of the civilian population suffering from shortages of food, water, 
medicine and even shelter. Thus, humanitarian actors, following the principles of impartiality and 
independence, should engage any group that de facto controls a territory and a population. Over 
the past two decades, humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) and Geneva Call, have developed the practice of engagement with NSAG (Perrin 
2012). Humanitarian actors have diverse objectives that need different types of engagement. While 
most of them negotiate with rebel groups to gain access to an area and deliver material assistance, 
others engage in policy advocacy trying to reduce unlawful conduct in hostilities. Humanitarian 
engagement usually consists of unofficial talks with rebel leaders, sometimes with the help of 
third-parties such as local civil society organizations. Geneva Call has, since the early 2000s, 
exclusively engaged with non-state armed groups in order to advocate for international norms. The 
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NGO select rebel groups to engage on specific issues, namely the use of anti-personnel mines, the 
use of child soldiers and sexual abuses in conflicts. Humanitarian engagement with NSAG 
represents a contemporary challenge that could lead to new policy solutions and improve the 
conditions of civilians in civil wars. 
 
1.2 Research question 
 
In this paper, I will try to investigate whether humanitarian engagement with rebels has an 
impact on their compliance with international norms. My research question is therefore the 
following: 
 
To what extent is Geneva Call’s humanitarian engagement with violent rebel groups in 
Sudan from 2010 to 2015 effective at inducing their compliance to international norms?  
 
1.3 Relevance of the research 
 
Civil wars account for the vast majority of conflicts today, making rebels large scale 
perpetrators of violence (Kalyvas 2006). War is by definition violent and brutal but the 
international community has developed since the first Hague conventions in 1899 numerous 
treaties and agreements to make war more ‘humane’, in order to reduce suffering (Jo 2015). 
Therefore, it is important to understand why and how rebels can comply with international norms, 
to reduce human suffering in intrastate conflicts. Jo proved that many rebel groups can be 
compliant but research is lacking as to how rebel groups can be more compliant. We know that 
humanitarian organizations have advocated humanitarian norms to rebels, but no detailed account 
on the effectiveness of their engagement exists. It is generally assumed that engagement has a 
positive effect but lacks empirical evidence. As an organization dedicated to promote the respect 
of international norms to NSAGs, Geneva Call has since 2000 engaged over 90 NSAGs 
worldwide. It offers valuable and available information to study the effectiveness of one type of 
humanitarian engagement. I would like to note that the ICRC is the leader in engaging any actor 
on international norms but the required secrecy of their operations make it impossible to assess 
their operations and activities (Ratner 2011). Answering the research question will provide 
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(limited) evidence on the impact of humanitarian engagement on rebel groups’ compliance with 
international norms. This would have repercussion for policy making if we knew that engaging 
rebels improves their compliance to international norms.  
 
2 Literature review 
Before delving into the analysis of Geneva Call’s engagement with various rebel groups, it is 
important to clarify several points. First and foremost, we will define important terms and concepts 
using existing literature: rebel groups, humanitarian actors and international norms. Second, we 
will ask why rebel groups would comply with international norms bringing the concept of 
legitimacy. Third, we will give an overview of what kind of humanitarian engagement is possible, 
emphasizing the role of norm diffusion. 
 
2.1 Rebel groups or Non-State Armed Group (NSAG) 
 
No clear or unanimous definition of rebels, often labelled Non-State Armed Group (NSAG), 
is dominant in the literature. For instance, the International Council on Human Rights Policy 
(2000, 5) has developed a broad definition, defining them as groups that are “armed and use force 
to achieve their objectives and are not under state control”. Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich 
Schneckener add that NSAG are “(i) willing and capable to use violence for pursuing their 
objectives and (ii) not integrated into formalized state institutions such as regular armies, 
presidential guards, police, or special forces. They, therefore, (iii) possess a certain degree of 
autonomy with regard to politics, military operations, resources, and infrastructure” (Hofmann and 
Schneckener 2011a, 604). Besides, NSAG can be understood in terms of the territory they control, 
the identity of their members, the origin of their resources and their relationship to the wider 
society (DCAF and Geneva Call 2015). These criteria will help define later on in my research what 
I mean by the label ‘rebel group’ or ‘NSAG’ (I will use the terms rebel group or NSAG 
interchangeably).  
Rebel groups are very diverse in terms of organizational structure, military means, foreign 
support, political strength and funding sources (Grace, n.d.). They can be national liberation 
movements, insurgent guerrilla groups, terrorist organizations and even warlords and militias. 
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Limiting my analysis to rebels groups in Sudan, the most appropriate definition of the groups under 
examination is insurgency. Indeed, insurgents are usually small and lightly armed groups 
practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas (Mulaj 2010). Mulaj (2010, 4) rightly notes that 
“clear-cut boundaries” do not exist, with a form of fluidity between the categories. Despite their 
diversity, rebels are political actors, not just military ones, and their political demands frame their 
action. Their political objectives are sometimes clearly identifiable, sometimes contested. I will be 
looking at rebel groups rather than individual rebels, considering group level decision-making. 
The group represents the ideas and actions of an organization rather than those of a single person. 
It means that the group should have at least a basic command structure. Without it, it is a mere 
grouping of armed individuals difficult to engage.  
 
2.2 Humanitarian actors 
 
Similar to rebel groups, humanitarian actors are a very diverse group. Hugo Slim (1996) 
differentiates between three main groups of actors: the UN, the ICRC and the wider red 
Cross/Crescent movement and NGOs, both national and international. The UN and the ICRC are 
intergovernmental organizations since they are mandated by agreements among states. The UN is 
founded on the UN Charter and specific conventions forms the mandate of UN agencies. UN 
agencies such the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food 
Program (WFP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) play an important role in the 
humanitarian response. The ICRC is founded on the Geneva Convention and the additional 
protocols. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is tasked to 
coordinate and share information among humanitarian actors to improve the effectiveness of the 
response. Nowadays, the NGO sector is diverse with thousands of ‘humanitarian’ NGOs in the 
world. However, Slim (1996) reminds us that most NGOs do not operate in high profile 
emergencies and that a high proportion of funding goes to prominent international NGOs. ALNAP 
(2015) reports that 31% percent of NGO funding goes to just five International NGOs, namely 
Médecins Sans Frontière (MSF), Save the Children, Oxfam, World Vision, and International 
Rescue Committee (IRC). Slim (1996, 128) uses the label “premier league of international NGOs”. 
NGOs are different than the UN and the ICRC since they are not based on intergovernmental 
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agreements but rather emerge from the civil society. Egeland, Harmer and Stoddard (2011) 
mention that humanitarian actors should all respect the humanitarian principles of humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality and independence.  
The diversity of actors represents a challenge when looking at humanitarian engagement 
with rebel groups. Indeed, they have different mandates or missions, funding sources, operating 
zones and methods. For instance, UNHCR is primarily focused on supporting and protecting 
refugees, while WHO works alongside governments to improve medical conditions worldwide. 
Nonetheless, the ICRC, the Carter Center, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and Geneva Call 
are among the most prominent humanitarian organizations engaging NSAGs. As mentioned above, 
the ICRC has a very specific mandate given the Geneva Convention allowing to access prisoners 
of war and ensure a more humane conduct of hostilities between belligerents (International 
Institute of Humanitarian Law 2014). To continue to operate in many contexts, the ICRC does not 
‘blame and shame’ non-compliant actors keeping details of its activities private (Ratner 2011). 
The Carter Center and the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue are leading organizations engaging 
in political resolutions of conflict with rebel groups and governments (The Carter Center 2017; 
The Center for Humanitarian Dialogue 2017). Reducing human suffering is an objective but is 
achieved through political mediation and peace building. Finally, Geneva Call is a relatively young 
NGO that specifically engages NSAGs to enhance their compliance to international norms. It 
originated in the late 1990s from the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (or the Ottawa 
Convention), with a key understanding that it could not be achieved without involving NSAGs 
(Bongard and Somer 2011). Geneva Call rapidly expanded its activities to encompass 
humanitarian norms more broadly, notably including protection of children and the interdiction of 
sexual violence in conflicts (Bongard and Somer 2011). Geneva Call is particularly interesting 
because it developed an innovative mechanism to enhance compliance to international norms: the 
Deed of Commitment. Since its inception, the NGO has engaged over 60 NSAGs with 41 signing 
Deeds of Commitments limiting their violent behavior in conflicts (Herr 2010). In a progress report 
dated from 2007, Geneva Call concludes of overall compliance with several success stories in 
Somalia and Sudan (Geneva Call 2007). Geneva Call’s method of engagement, including the Deed 
of Commitment, will be further detailed in section 2.5 on humanitarian engagement. 
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2.3 International norms 
 
International norms in this paper will be defined as the combination of International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights Law (HRL) pertaining to rebel groups. IHL, 
sometimes labelled the Law of Armed Conflict or the Law of War, are the rules regulating the 
conduct of armed conflict. Contrary to jus ad bellum, IHL, jus in bello, does not consider the 
reasons of engaging armed action but rather looks at methods and means of warfare once a conflict 
erupts. IHL is based upon the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and three Additional Protocols of 
1977 and 2005 that primarily focused on protecting people that do not or no longer participate in 
war activities (Kelley 2013). IHL distinguishes between international and non-international wars. 
For the purpose of studying NSAGs, the second definition applies. First and foremost, realization 
that NSAGs are not signatories to IHL but nevertheless subjects to some of its rules is crucial: 
rebel groups are not allowed to participate in intrastate treaties and international lawmaking (Saul 
2017). Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions puts restrictions on the conduct of NSAGs 
that must respect humanitarian obligations of around 140 rules (Saul 2017). Without entering in 
too much detail, Additional Protocol II puts stronger restrictions on the conduct of NSAG that 
must respect IHL provisions when in control of territories. While variations in interpretations exist, 
the ICRC believes that control of territory may only be partial and differentiate itself from that of 
the state (Bellal and Casey-Maslen 2011; Bellal, Giacca, and Casey-Maslen 2011). Another 
applicability condition is the level of intensity of hostilities. IHL does not cover for riots and 
sporadic acts of violence but applies to actors using armed forces and military means (Mack and 
Pejic 2008). Moreover, IHL applies to rebel groups that have some form of structure (Bellal and 
Casey-Maslen 2011). Despite all this, humanitarian law remains less developed for NSAG than 
for states counterparts (Herr 2010). We observe a growing attention to the issue with lawmakers, 
diplomats and scholars delving into the issue. 
HRL is commonly understood to apply at all times. Therefore, once a threshold of violence 
is passed, IHL and HRL will complement each other. Some debate arises in the literature as to the 
applicability of HRL to NSAG but this paper takes the understanding that Human Rights lie at the 
individual level. Indeed, each person is owed dignity and his or her rights should be respected by 
everyone. Some argue that rebel groups are bound by HRL when they exercise control over a 
territory or population (Bellal and Casey-Maslen 2011; Saul 2017). Moreover, political actors such 
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as the UN Security Council have called on all actors to respect human rights obligations in the 
Darfur conflict in 2012 (United Nations Security Council 2012). The International Law 
Association lies behind this understanding by concluding that NSAG should be bound by core 
international human rights (Bellal, Giacca, and Casey-Maslen 2011). Human Rights such as the 
rights to life, to freedom from torture and inhuman treatment or punishment, to health should apply 
to anyone including rebel groups. Besides, different mechanisms with human rights background 
have been established to protect children in armed conflict. Monitoring and ‘naming and shaming’ 
mechanisms try to encourage government and rebel groups to respect children’s rights. These 
include the notable prohibition on the use of child soldiers (Bellal and Casey-Maslen 2011). 
Tensions remain for two main reasons: on the one hand, states often talk of ‘abuses’ of Human 
Rights rather than ‘violations’ to avoid legitimizing a rebel group. On the other hand, most NSAGs 
are practically unable to ensure basic respect of HRL (Saul 2017). Finally, international criminal 
law developed since 1998 and the adoption of the Rome Statute. The ICC can hold individual 
members of rebel groups accountable for their actions by prosecuting them for war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide. The ICC should complement and not replace the national 
jurisdiction. This body can provide greater pressure on military and political commanders to 
respect international norms. A case in point is the arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir issued by 
the ICC in the summer of 2008, becoming one of the highest individuals prosecuted 
(Weldehaimanot 2011).  
It is true that IHL and HRL were designed for interstate war rather than intrastate conflict. 
On one side, some rebels do claim that they are not bound by international norms since they did 
not participate in their development. This is the case for example of Farabundo Marti National 
Liberation Front in El Salvador that claimed that no agreement between the belligerents has been 
made (Roberts and Sivakumaran 2012). On the other side, states are reluctant to negotiate with 
rebels since it could offer them a platform for legitimacy and placed them at a state level (Steinhoff 
2009). The argument of legal status and legitimacy gain is, however, deemed unjustified for several 
reasons. First, states act in self-interests trying to preserve their edge in the violent opposition. 
Second, recognizing that rebel groups are bound by international law does not make state entities 
(Roberts and Sivakumaran 2012). Third, at a certain threshold of violence, humanitarian 
imperatives should outweigh legitimacy and legal concerns (Steinhoff 2009). This threshold is 
likely to differ for the different actors involved: states would prefer better protection when their 
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soldiers are defeated while international community may favor humanitarian goals early on to 
provide better protection for the civilian population. Steinhoff (2009, 321) argues that state's’ 
legitimacy concerns may not be rooted in the legal effects of laws but rather can be explained by 
collateral consequences: “maintaining state sovereignty despite a high human cost”. Moreover, 
these international norms have evolved to include the realities of today’s conflicts, namely the 
presence of NSAGs. This is the case of Additional Protocol II and new mechanisms used by the 
UN Security Council and NGOs. Better inclusion of rebel groups in the making of norms and laws 
could create a sense of ownership leading to increasing compliance to those norms. It does not 
mean that rebel groups should have equal lawmaking powers with the states, but rather using 
innovative mechanisms to give rebel groups the possibility to join existing conventions or adhere 
to new ones, without compromising on the state-centric system or humanitarian norms (Roberts 
and Sivakumaran 2012).  
 
2.4 Legitimacy and rebel compliance 
 
        Let us turn now to the concept of legitimacy. Suchman (1995, 574) defines legitimacy as 
"a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions". 
He later distinguishes between three types of legitimacy: pragmatic, moral and cognitive (Suchman 
1995). Pragmatic legitimacy refers to the actions and behavior of the group and its consequences 
on the constituency. Moral legitimacy focuses on whether a group actions are judged to be moral. 
Cognitive legitimacy is created when a group is seeking goals that society deems to be proper and 
desirable. Easton (1965, 25:278) thinks that legitimacy can be perceived as a “reservoir of 
favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are 
opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants”. Legitimacy has several 
positive effects: it can foster stability, facilitate support to the legitimate group and shape how 
actors engage in conflicts (Forest, LaFree, and Morris 2012). Beetham is famously known for his 
work on “The Legitimation of Power”, in which he differentiates three dimensions of legitimacy. 
Indeed, for a group to be legitimate, it must conform to rules (legal validity), the rules must be 
justifiable in terms of people’s beliefs and there must be consent by the constituency (Beetham 
2013). These three dimensions allow to better understand the concept of legitimacy: legality, 
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beliefs and consent all play a role in conferring legitimacy to a group. These three dimensions can 
be useful when studying engagement between humanitarian actors and rebels: legitimacy can 
partly be gained by respecting rules and international norms, which is central to this paper. 
        A central puzzle in the study of NSAG is why some respect international norms in the 
conduct of hostilities? Rebellions are often inferior in military capabilities to their government 
counterparts and should thus use any military tactics necessary to overcome the opposition. Rebel 
groups should not want to be constrained by rules of engagement or humanitarian norms. 
Moreover, rebel groups had no influence in creating the norms, neither did they sign them. The 
incentives to respect the norms are therefore weak. It is legitimate to ask why would rebel groups 
comply? Jo (2015) develops a theory of rebel compliance centered around the argument that 
legitimacy-seeking rebels are more likely to comply with international norms that legitimacy 
indifferent rebels. He identifies domestic and international constituencies that may encourage the 
group to comply with the norms. Indeed, some rebels rely on population support to carry out their 
actions, while others seek international support to maintain their struggle. A combination of the 
two is also possible. In order to gain the support of either constituency, the group should appear as 
a legitimate actor. Unconstrained violence against civilians can, for instance, reduce the appeal of 
the rebel group vis-à-vis the civilian population under its control or a foreign sponsor. Political 
survival will play a role when rebel groups have to decide whether to follow or not international 
norms. The key finding is that rebel groups in civil wars can comply with international norms. 
Many do so in order to gain legitimacy in the constituencies that have an influence on them. 
Recognition or material support can derive from complying with international norms (Jo 2015). 
Therefore, “the motivations of legitimacy-seeking rebel groups provide an opportunity for external 
actors to influence their behavior in a meaningful fashion” (Jo 2015, 252). No all NSAGs are 
spoilers in civil wars, rather they can have constructive political roles based on popular support 
and international legitimacy (Podder 2013). The purpose of this paper is to explore the 
effectiveness on the influence of humanitarian engagement on their compliance with international 
norms.   
 Others have also questioned themselves on potential factors that would make rebel groups 
comply with norms they did not participate in building nor allowed to sign. Adding to the 
preceding arguments, is it often in the group’s self-interest to comply. Restrictions in the conduct 
of military operations can help retain popular support and obtain a form of reciprocity from the 
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other side (Bellal and Casey-Maslen 2011). Long-term victory can also be facilitated by humane 
combat such as avoiding anti-personnel mines, child soldiering and humane treatment of prisoners 
(Saul 2017).  The fear of criminal prosecution or the loss of foreign support also plays a role in 
NSAGs’ decision to comply with norms. Indictments by the ICC, arms embargoes or asset freezes 
are often in the mind of senior leaders that wish to pursue the rebellion (Bellal and Casey-Maslen 
2011). Furthermore, it is simply sometimes in the convictions of the rebel group to comply with 
international norms and their desire to sustain a good public image and reputation (Bellal and 
Casey-Maslen 2011; Saul 2017). Humanitarian organizations can use these when they decide to 
strategically engage with rebel groups. 
 
2.5 Humanitarian Engagement 
 
In a state-centric international system, the traditional view is that engagement with violent 
rebel groups will give them credibility and legitimacy and branding them as terrorist, in the hope 
that they will eventually disappear, is much more common (Ricigliano 2005). There are many 
reasons why armed groups should be engaged. These include protecting the civilian population, 
reaching a peace agreement or ending hostilities, improving compliance to international norms and 
upholding states’ obligation to ensure respect of IHL (Ricigliano 2005; Steinhoff 2009). Possible 
concerns, among which the granting of legal status and legitimacy have largely been overstated 
(Roberts and Sivakumaran 2012). Engagement and negotiations are uneasy, sometimes risky and 
largely depend on contextual circumstances, but reasons for interaction outweigh the challenges 
(Zartman and Faure 2011). 
Given the clear benefits of engaging NSAGs, it is important to understand what types of 
engagement exist. To begin with, rebel groups are partners and interlocutors for negotiations. 
Steinhoff (2009, 305) defines humanitarian engagement as “a mechanism by which non-state 
armed groups can participate in humanitarian norm building”. He further identifies three types of 
engagements, namely special agreement or memorandum of understanding, a unilateral 
declaration and a verbal agreement (Steinhoff 2009). Broadening up the definition and 
encompassing the diversity of humanitarian actors, Perrin defines humanitarian engagement as a 
“non-coercive process of interaction for the purposes of ensuring the provision of humanitarian 
assistance to populations affected by armed conflicts, the safety of humanitarian workers, and 
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better respect for IHL and IHRL” (Perrin 2012, 74). Humanitarian actors have particular reasons 
for engaging rebels: they may want access to a territory for the delivery of aid, seek the resolution 
of conflict through dialogue and mediation and promote international norms in order to modify the 
behavior of rebels to protect civilians and combatants (Bryce et al. 2016). The advocacy for IHL 
in conflict can be both passive or active depending on the context. When looking at conflict 
resolution, multi-track diplomacy has rapidly evolved in the past three decades to become widely 
accepted by researchers and practitioners (Mapendere 2005). While track one diplomacy is carried 
by official government actors, Montville (1987, 162) defines track two diplomacy as “unofficial, 
informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop 
strategies, to influence public opinion, organize human and material resources in ways that might 
help resolve their conflict”. Humanitarian actors, while not able to resolve the conflict on their 
own, use informal, track two, interactions with rebels.  
The most comprehensive effort to conceptualize the engagement of humanitarian actors 
with rebel groups has been realized by Hofmann and Schneckener (2011b) (see Figure 1). What 
we can observe is four main methods of interacting with NSAGs. First, NGOs can participate in 
conflict resolution by talking to opposing sides and reach ceasefires, peace settlement and post-
conflict agreements. The Center for Humanitarian Dialogue or the Carter Center are example of 
NGOs performing such activities. Second, a large part of humanitarian organizations is mainly 
preoccupied in providing aid to people in need. MSF offers medical help in conflict zones, Action 
Against Hunger distributes food and other supplies and the Norwegian Refugee Council builds 
shelter for forcibly displaced people. In many cases, they interact with rebel groups to access areas 
where people need their services. Third, a range of international NGOs use public tools to raise 
awareness on some issues. With regular interactions between humanitarian actors and rebels, 
socialization takes place and rebel groups may be more likely to follow norms and rules. By 
naming and shaming bad actions and behaviors, humanitarian actors can put social pressure, 
harming their legitimacy and forcing them to respect the norms and rules. Human Rights Watch 
and the International Crisis Group provide such services. Fourth and finally, a smaller group of 
NGOs try to convince NSAG to abide by international norms. They directly engage and advocate 
to rebels, trying to reach binding agreements and monitoring mechanisms (Hofmann and 
Schneckener 2011b). This method of engagement, namely norm diffusion, is explored in this paper 
through the work of Geneva Call.  
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Figure 1: Taken from Hofmann, Claudia, and Ulrich Schneckener. NGOs and nonstate armed actors: Improving compliance with 
international norms. US Institute of Peace, 2011. 
 
Norm diffusion has been the subject to scholarly research since Carr distinguished between 
economic, military and power over opinion (Carr 1962). Norm diffusion is essentially possible 
because of the ability of some actors to convince others through argumentation. This power of 
ideas is powerful because you can shape someone’s will through intangible things (Galtung 1973). 
Besides, the term ‘soft power’, coined by Joseph Nye, is vastly employed nowadays showing the 
extent to which norms and ideas play an important role in international affairs. Norm diffusion 
literature has developed over the past two decades to give more importance to non-state actors that 
create and adapt norms in accordance to their beliefs (Acharya 2014). They can then project those 
onto the world stage through various mechanisms described by Ian Manners. Humanitarian actors 
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make primarily use of informational diffusion, procedural diffusion and transference but passive 
mechanisms of diffusion also occur with overt and cultural diffusion (Manners 2002). 
Informational diffusion is the key method used by Geneva Call as they approach NSAGs. They 
make use of strategic argumentation to convince NSAGs to comply and adhere with international 
norms. Indeed, rather than simply stating the law, Geneva Call presents arguments, depending on 
the context, that would be in the self-interest of the rebel group. These could include reputation 
issues, reciprocity of the opposing side or criminal prosecution that have shortly been explored in 
section 2.4 (Mack and Pejic 2008). Procedural diffusion occurs when relationship between a 
humanitarian organization and a NSAG have a form of institutionalization (Manners 2002). In the 
case of Geneva Call, relationships become institutionalized when a NSAG signs a Deed of 
Commitment that brings binding monitoring and verifying mechanisms (Bongard and Somer 
2011). Transference is defined as the exchange of aid or technical assistance (Manners 2002). 
Geneva Call provides education and training to NSAGs to enhance their comprehension and 
compliance with international norms. For instance, they developed training material ‘Fighter Not 
Killer’ that has been transposed into pedagogical videos and exercises available via internet and a 
mobile phone application (Geneva Call 2017). Finally, overt diffusion, resulting from the 
prolonged physical interaction with NSAGs, and cultural diffusion, resulting from the learning 
process and modification of the NSAG’s political and social identity, are both reinforcing the 
diffusion of international norms to NSAGs in the long term (Manners 2002). Harder to observe, 
they will only be considered as reinforcing mechanism in the background.  
 As mentioned previously, Geneva Call has developed innovative approaches to enhance 
NSAGs’ compliance with international norms, in particular the Deed of Commitment (shortened 
Deed or Deeds). The organization use an inclusive approach whereby NSAGs can take ownership 
of international norms by voluntary signing unilateral declarations. Differentiating itself from 
coercive measures such as ‘naming and shaming’, Geneva Call employs constructive methods 
through sustained dialogue and advocacy. Privileging incremental improvements over time, the 
NGOs does offer the possibility for NSAGs to adhere to some but not all rules (Bongard and Somer 
2011). The idea is that an initial ban on a mine can lead to further adherence to international norms 
and perhaps even peacebuilding (Holmqvist 2005). The Deed, a type of unilateral declaration, was 
developed by the organization to facilitate and offer possibilities to rebel groups to officially 
pledge adherence to international norms reserved for states. As of June 2017, Deeds banning anti-
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personnel mines, protecting children in conflicts and prohibiting sexual violence and gender 
discrimination have been created. Co-signed by the NGO and the Canton of Geneva, Deeds 
improve accountability and respectability without changing the group’s legal status (Bryce et al. 
2016). Signing a Deed of Commitment implies that the NSAG will implement the commitments 
and agree to monitoring mechanisms (Geneva Call field missions, self-reporting and third-party 
monitoring). The interesting component of the deed is that NSAG agree to consider engagement 
on other humanitarian issues allowing to Geneva Call to implement its step-by-step approach 
(Bongard and Somer 2011; Perrin 2012). More practically, Geneva Call offers trainings and 
technical counsel to rebel groups on how to better respect international norms. Presentations and 
practical exercises aim at explaining the rules and how to implement them. In addition, civil society 
is often invited to participate in seminars and training to develop local advocacy and monitoring 
capacity (Geneva Call 2017).  
 
3 Methodology and data 
 
The method of this paper is qualitative and exploratory in nature. Using descriptive analysis 
of secondary and primary sources, the paper will provide answers to the research question based 
on existing scholarship and empirical evidence. Clear causal links will not be identified, rather 
plausible causality of Geneva Call’s engagement with NSAGs and its impact on norm compliance 
will be demonstrated. In addition, analyses of the findings will show relevant factors of 
effectiveness. 
The research design is to proceed with process-tracing of a case study to highlight to what 
extent Geneva Call method of engagement is effective at inducing compliance for rebel groups. 
George and Bennet (2005, 207) define process-tracing as to “remove the blind and look at the 
intervening dominos, which give evidence on potential processes”. The advantage of using 
process-tracing is two-fold: first, it can check for spuriousness and second, it will give a detailed 
picture of the engagement of Geneva Call with NSAGs in Sudan, making it easier to identify 
effective processes. The case study consists of four rebel groups operating in Sudan from 2010 
until 2015. Sudan was chosen due to exploitable information, being a civil war with insurgents 
opposing the government. Conflict dynamics and the rebel groups’ characteristics will show that 
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the level of violence is sufficient and that rebel group possess a command structure. These 
characteristics mean that IHL and HRL, that I defined as international norms, apply to rebel groups 
in both conflicts. Geneva Call activities in Sudan, followed by an evaluation of the rebel groups 
compliance with international norms will complete the case study. Criteria of effectiveness include 
the occurrence of unilateral declarations, dialogues, trainings and other identifiable actions. I will 
subsequently present and analyze findings before drawing some policy implications.  
        In terms of sources for my research, I use secondary sources and primary sources in a 
complementary way and notably Geneva Call documents that indicate activities and agreements 
with rebel groups. Triangulating the findings with a variety of sources will be essential. Moreover, 
I intend to look into the background of the scholars I referenced in order to avoid potential biases 
and pre-established ideas. Cross-referencing with a variety of authors will be used to bring a more 
nuanced vision. 
         
4 Geneva Call in Sudan 
 
4.1 Conflict and context 
 
Since British occupation ended in 1955 and Sudan gained its independence in 1956, the 
country has faced numerous violent conflicts involving a wide array of rebel groups. Two civil 
wars opposed the central Sudanese government in Khartoum to the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) in Southern Sudan fighting for independence and recognition. The 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 ended the second civil war between the two 
belligerents and ultimately led to the secession of South Sudan, becoming the newest country to 
date in July 2011 (de Waal 2013). In addition, Sudan also suffered violent uprisings in other of its 
peripheries, the most notable being the crisis in Darfur that erupted in 2003. Since 2011 and at the 
time of writing, rebel groups are battling government forces in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, 
while violent clashes still continue in Darfur. A brief depiction of conflict dynamics and rebel 
groups origins will help grasp the context and the importance of Geneva Call’s engagement with 
rebel groups in Sudan. 
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The main conflict in Sudan after its independence erupted between the Arab-dominated 
Khartoum government and the Christian dominated Southern province. Grievances and 
marginalization date back to the 19th century where people in the south suffered slave raiding and 
agricultural exploitation by Arab merchants from the north. Colonial times, under Anglo-Egyptian 
governance, reinforced the power imbalances between the two regions (McNamee 2012). The 
Arab elite monopolized power and resources, implementing policies of Arabization and 
Islamization triggering sustained armed rebellion with relative peace for just a decade from 1972 
until 1983 after the Addis Ababa agreements (Belloni 2011). The second internal conflict alone 
cost two million lives and displaced over four million people (McNamee 2012). It still does bear 
its marks on both countries today. The CPA signed in 2005 ended at last the bloody conflict with 
a power-sharing agreement between North and South and the promise of referendum of 
independence. Poor implementation of the CPA led to de facto two single-party states with unity 
a vague illusion (Ottaway and El-Sadany 2012). The elite in Khartoum as showed little or no 
willingness to dramatically change the governance structure, leading in consequence, southern 
leaders to only see independence as the solution. They were comforted by an overwhelming vote 
in favor of independence in 2011 (McNamee 2012; Belloni 2011). The civil conflict still matters 
today as remnants of the SPLM, namely the SPLM-North (SPLM-N), is still fighting the Khartoum 
government in Sudan. 
Moreover, despite independence, tensions between the north and south still persist. 
Dependence on oil revenues for both countries is staggering, representing around 60% of the 
budget for Sudan and 98% for South Sudan (Ottaway and El-Sadany 2012). Most of the oil fields 
are located in the south or in contested areas at the borders between the two countries, while export 
infrastructure is developed in the north. In April 2012, South Sudan’s army crossed the border to 
seize the Heglig oil fields causing threats of war from both parties. There have been regular 
incursions of southern troops into Sudan and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have been 
bombings target on the southern side of the border (Ottaway and El-Sadany 2012). The South has 
also been accused of using the SPLM-N as a proxy against its northern neighbor; claims that have 
largely been unfounded. Indeed, the SPLM-N, despite historic ties and friendly attitudes towards 
the SPLM, build an independent political and military organization with specific objectives. 
Furthermore, South Sudan has been embroiled in its state-building complications and has had little 
time and resources to devote to the northern rebel group (Brosché 2011).  
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The SPLM-N is one of the group subject to the study of this paper. It is thus important to 
spend some time detailing its characteristics. As mentioned above, SPLM-N is a splitter faction of 
the SPLM that was created in 2011 over political differences on the fate of the South Kordofan 
and Blue Nile regions. The CPA mandated popular consultations in both regions to see what kind 
of governance should be implemented. However, they were never properly carried out, fueling the 
already existing grievances (de Villiers 2015). The SPLM-N has clear political objectives: it seeks 
to change the government in Khartoum and establish a new form of governance working for the 
benefit of all Sudanese people regardless of their religion, gender or ethnic background (Brosché 
2011). Malik Agar, the chairman of the group and originally present in the legal political 
opposition and the deputy chairman, Abdel-Aziz, who controls the South Kordofan branch of the 
movement, are leading the rebel group (Gramizzi and Tubiana 2013). The political demands are 
rooted in the long marginalization and exclusion from power of the peripheries. The rebels ask for 
increase political autonomy from central government and better allocation of region’s oil resources 
(de Villiers 2015). The rebel group has a substantial number of troops, with some estimating a 
30,000-35,000 armed force, composed mostly with Nuba tribesmen and a few members of Arab 
tribes, notably from the Missiriya and Hawazma tribes. In their beginnings, the group largely 
benefited from SPLA armories but rapidly captured vast military equipment after early victories. 
These include light weaponry, mortars, tanks and mines (Gramizzi and Tubiana 2013). The group 
has launched large military offensive in South Kordofan in June 2011 and followed in Blue Nile 
in September of that year (Ottaway and El-Sadany 2012). It seized the opportunity of the 
independence that left the government with limited oil revenues and an unprecedented economic 
crisis (Gramizzi and Tubiana 2013).  
The SPLM-N rebellion has so far largely been focused on fighting government forces in 
South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Since 2011, particularly fierce fighting happened in the Nuba 
mountains, the home base of the rebel group, and around the regional capital city of Kaduqli. The 
SPLM-N was rapidly joined by other rebel groups from Darfur. In November 2011, they formed 
the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) together with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and 
both factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). Political dissidents from opposition parties 
also joined the movement. The SRF aims at unifying diverse rebel groups under a single political 
entity to topple the Khartoum government (Gramizzi and Tubiana 2013). This coalition fosters 
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coordination allowing rebel groups to have a greater impact on the government in various areas 
(Lyman 2013).  
To complete the picture of the conflict dynamics and NSAG under scrutiny, it necessary to 
have a look at the Darfuri conflict and the main rebel groups, namely the JEM and the SLA. The 
stark differences between the center and the periphery, in the case Darfur, was also key in 
triggering armed rebellion. The Khartoum government pursued a policy of Arabization and 
Islamization to the detriment of numerous other ethnic groups, left with a feeling of oppression 
and neglect (Cockett 2016). Tensions escalated between agrarian, settled Darfuris and pastoralist 
nomadic Arab communities (de Villiers 2015). While large-scale and intense violence started in 
2003, low-intensity conflict between tribes already existed since the middle of the 1990s. In 2002, 
self-defense groups organized into military organizations and soon after launched attacks on 
government and military targets, for instance at the airbase at El Fasher, in April 2003 (Cockett 
2016). After a series of rebel victories in the middle of 2003, the government decided to react, 
launching a brutal counterinsurgency campaign. The timing was critical as Sudan was negotiating 
a peace agreement with the SPLM, deemed the priority of major international powers. The level 
of violence was astounding but largely out of the attention of media organizations and western 
powers (Cockett 2016). The military solution, chosen by the regime of Bashir, turned rapidly into 
ethnic cleaning with the combination of indiscriminate aerial bombings and raids by the 
Janjanweed militia terrorizing the population and killing scores. By 2010, 300,000 people were 
killed, and over 3 million forcibly displaced (Cockett 2016). 
The SLA’s creation can be traced back to 2001 when different tribes met in Abu Gamra and 
decided to work together to counter the Arab supremacist policies, forming the Darfur Liberation 
Front (Flint and De Waal 2008; Gramizzi and Tubiana 2012). In March 2003, under their new 
name, the SLA published a political manifesto deploring political and economic marginalization 
and demanded decentralization and the creation of a secular state, in short a ‘New Sudan’ (Daly 
2007). It was the largest military group with an estimated 10,000 men in 2004-2005, essentially 
coming from the Zaghawa, Fur and Masalit ethnicities (Tanner, Tubiana, and Griffin 2007). The 
group’s head was the president Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur (Fur), with the vice president 
Khamis Abdallah Abbakar (Masalit) and the general secretary Minni Minawi (Zaghawa Wogi) 
completing the top positions (Gramizzi and Tubiana 2012).  
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The other major protagonist in Darfur was the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). JEM 
announced itself just weeks after the SLA in the hopes of drawing international attention. 
However, it had weak military forces and had to rely on the SLA help to avoid defeat in towns 
along the Chadian border (Flint and De Waal 2008). However, the group’s strength lied into its 
leader, Khalil Ibrahim, a highly educated Zaghawa, smart political entrepreneur and great 
organizer, with the ability to understand the importance of publicity. Evidence can be found in the 
group’s origins with the publication of the Black Book demonstrating the planned 
underdevelopment of Darfur with clear signs of political and economic discrimination (Daly 
2007). JEM was also one of the first to portray the conflict in Darfur as a genocide to international 
powers. The group’s objectives were to unify Sudan and fight against marginalization with specific 
national solutions, such as a rotating presidency between Sudan’s regions. Unlike the secular 
aspect of the SLA, and given its Islamist background, JEM does not offer a separation of state and 
religion (Flint and De Waal 2008). Before 2006, the group can more accurately be described as a 
political party with an armed branch. In comparison to the SLA, it has a more rigid structure and 
delegated authority with the creation of an executive board, a legislative committee and a General 
Congress. After 2006 and until 2010, JEM received support from the Chadian regime of Idriss 
Déby and the Libyan regime of Colonel Qaddafi, making it the strongest military group in Darfur. 
The rebels expanded their operations in July 2011 by sending troops to Nuba mountains, in support 
of the SPLM-N. It subsequently joined the SRF. In December 2011, after the SAF killed Khalil in 
airstrike, his brother Jibril and secretary of foreign affairs was appointed as the new JEM leader 
and SRF vice president of foreign relations and humanitarian affairs. JEM possess around 300 
vehicles and 2,000 fighters, making it the strongest Darfuri group. JEM employs highly mobile 
tactics with effective logistics and coordination. They operate along the border with Chad, in 
eastern Darfur, South Kordofan and South Sudan (Gramizzi and Tubiana 2012). 
As the SLA grew rapidly, ethnic differences and lack of leadership became problematic. It 
was rather “a marriage of convenience rather than of conviction” and differences were hard to 
handle (Flint and De Waal 2008, 95). Some accused the group of being a combination of young 
and inexperienced fighters that leave no room for intellectuals and political leaders. At the 
Haskanita conference in October 2005, the group splitted in two main factions: the Sudan 
Liberation Army-Minni Arku Minawi (SLA-MM) and the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid 
(SLA-AW). Following the indication of the names, SLA-MM and SLA-AW broke apart each 
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following a different leader. Minni-Minawi led a Zaghawa contingent and signed the Darfur Peace 
Agreement in 2006. The group lost popular support, troops and military equipment the following 
years for its association with the government. Reversing course in 2010, the group battled again 
with government forces and associated militias. The government believes the group to have over 
500 combatants and 100 vehicles. Joining the SRF in February 2012, Minni Minawi was appointed 
vice president in charge of finance and administrative affairs (Gramizzi and Tubiana 2012). In 
contrary, the SLA-AW refused to sign the DPA and its leader flew to Paris. The absence of the 
field leadership caused a decrease in support. The group has mainly influence in the mountainous 
Jebel Marra area, and small parts of North Darfur with hundreds of combatants but a small number 
of vehicles. It draws support from the displaced Fur population. In joining the SRF in 2011, its 
leader Abdul Wahid was appointed vice president for political and legal affairs of the coalition 
(Gramizzi and Tubiana 2012).  
The fighting during the timeframe under examination largely occurs in the ‘two areas’, South 
Kordofan and Blue Nile, even tough clashes still take place in Darfur. South Kordofan is engulfed 
in armed conflict since 2011 and remains at a strategic stalemate, with each side unable to military 
defeat the other. Hostilities continue bearing a high toll on the civilian population (International 
Crisis Group 2013a). Mirroring Darfur’s tactics, government force usually target the civilian 
population believed to be favorable to the rebels with 700,000 reported affected by the conflict. 
Negotiations are not going anywhere, as strong differences in what should be on the table remain. 
On one side, rebels demand change at a national level, and on the other side, government refuses 
to diverge from local dimensions (Human Security Baseline Assessment 2016). Less prepared in 
Blue Nile, the SPLM-N was quickly pushed towards the South Sudanese border, losing their 
historic stronghold of Kurmuk. Rebel fragmentation, along tribal lines, is exploited by government 
forces, limiting the options for peace. Indiscriminate bombings on villages and agricultural lands 
causes large displacement with over 150,000 refugees from Blue Nile as of June 2013 
(International Crisis Group 2013b; Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) 2015). Darfur 
suffers from lower intensity conflict, nevertheless adding 500,000 people to the already 2 million 
internally displaced. Conflict sparked up in 2014 in various part of the region with SLA-MM in 
the eastern plains between North and South Darfur. The SLA-AW operates around the Jebbel 
Marra mountains in the center. UNAMID is largely ineffective despite a budget of over a billion 
USD, while humanitarian aid remains high at 700USD million (International Crisis Group 2014). 
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Patterns of marginalization and the use of brutal tactics seem to be a component of all three 
conflicts, with civilians in the line of fire. In this context, Geneva Call intervenes with rebel groups 
to reduce the human cost of the war. 
 
4.2 Geneva Call activities and achievements 
 
Geneva Call operations in Sudan started with the engagement of the SPLM, then under the 
leadership of John Garang, which agreed to sign the Deed banning anti-personnel (AP) mines in 
2001. After its independence in 2011, South Sudan first joined the AP Mine Ban Convention, 
reserved for states, due to its previous commitments under the Deed and the long-term engagement 
that Geneva Call had (Krieger 2013). However, the timeframe under examination is 2010-2015 
and the groups engaged are the SPLM-N, JEM, SLA-AW, SLA-MM in South Kordofan, Blue Nile 
and Darfur. 
Geneva Call started to engage with JEM in 2010 and 2011, proposing to the group a 
contribution to a study “In their Words”, aiming at furthering the understanding of NSAG on the 
protection of children in armed conflicts (Geneva Call 2011). The group stated that it is aware of 
the ’18 years old’ rule, banning the recruitment of children for armed action. It has policies and 
training in place to avoid the recruitment of child soldiers. Dr. Khalil Ibrahim signed a decree 
authorizing the establishment of a commission tasked to monitor human rights inside the JEM 
movement (Geneva Call 2010). While mostly symbolic, the gesture shows JEM’s leadership 
understanding of the importance of humanitarian norms. As mentioned in the previous section, 
JEM was founded by a well-educated elite able to understand the role of compliance with 
international norms and support from foreign actors. Again, an understanding of the rules does not 
equal compliance. Difficulty of access in a region, where many humanitarian organizations have 
been banned by the Sudan government, renders monitoring problematic. JEM indicated its interest 
in signing the Deed banning AP mines and dialogue on the Deed on child protection continued 
throughout 2011. Geneva Call worked with relevant civil society organizations and maintain a line 
of communication with the Khartoum government, mostly to maintain field access (Geneva Call 
2012). In April 2012, JEM signed the Deed banning AP mines and was the first active rebel group 
in Sudan to commit to the ban. JEM promised to modify its internal code of conduct to reflect the 
provisions of the Deed. Acknowledging the limited use of AP mines in Darfur, Geneva Call 
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President indicated the importance of reducing dangerous weapons proliferation in an unstable 
regional context, noting it could encourage others to follow suit (Carstairs 2012). 
In 2012, Geneva Call expanded its operations in Sudan, beginning dialogue with the SPLM-
N and the SLA factions. This was partly due to JEM’s work in introducing other members of the 
SRF to the NGO. Tense first exchanges must have occurred between the SPLM-N and Geneva 
Call representatives as the group denied possessing AP mines and using child soldiers, it is reported 
to possess (Gramizzi and Tubiana 2013). The NGO offered trainings and additional meetings with 
the rebels to improve norms compliance and the possible signing of the Deeds. In a similar fashion, 
the SLA-AW and SLA-MM rejected allegations on the use of child soldiers, despite being listed 
in the UN Secretary-General report on child soldiers (Geneva Call 2013a). Further assessments of 
the situation for all rebel groups, including stronger monitoring mechanisms were needed to have 
a clearer picture of the situation on the ground.  
As fighting and abuses of international norms continue in 2013, Geneva Call pursued its 
engagement with the four rebel groups. SPLM-N signed the Deed banning AP mines in August 
declaring possession of AP mines and its intention of destroying them in accordance with its 
obligations (Geneva Call 2013b). The rebel group also supported the creation of a local demining 
NGO to operate in areas it controlled. Moreover, seven members of the humanitarian wing of the 
rebel group in South Kordofan received a training on child protection. In a joint training, SPLM-
N and JEM senior commanders were given presentations on IHL to further their understanding on 
wider international norms, with positive feedback and additional training demanded by both actors. 
In March, JEM commanders and members of its humanitarian commission were trained on the 
Deed provisions and compliance mechanism and submitted the first report in July showing the 
effective modification of its internal code of conduct. The SLA-MM issued a command order 
forbidding the recruitment of child soldiers after discussions with Geneva Call, while discussions 
with the SLA-AW did not result in tangible outcomes. Partnering with International Refugee 
Rights Initiative and Amnesty International Netherlands, Geneva Call trained human rights 
monitors from South Kordofan and Blue Nile, hoping to improve the monitoring capacity in hard 
to reach regions. The technical expertise of Geneva Call members was used to explain the 
differences between types of mines and their regulations under international treaties and the Deeds 
(Geneva Call 2014a).  
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Both factions of the SLA signed the Deed banning AP mines in August 2014, meaning that 
all members of the SRF have now agreed on the ban of AP mines. Abdul Wahid Al-Nur, Chairman 
of the SLM/A-AW, stated that his group will “share information on areas affected by explosive 
remnants of war and assist relevant actors in their clearance” (Geneva Call 2014c). In addition, 
SLA factions and JEM reported on the steps taken to internalize rules on the prohibition of 
recruitment and use of child soldiers in conflicts. The SPLM-N asked Geneva Call for technical 
expertise on how its stock of AP mines, showing concrete willingness to abide by its obligations 
under the Deed. From 22nd to 24th October, in the first of its kind for Sudan, Geneva called offered 
several training sessions on humanitarian norms for 33 high-level officers, military commanders 
and legal advisers from the four NSAG (Geneva Call 2015a). Focusing on the Deeds and child 
protection, rebel leaders explain challenges in determining the age of some recruits and the charge 
of demobilized child soldiers. 700 illustrative booklets containing the main provisions of the Deeds 
were distributed to rank soldiers (Geneva Call 2014b).  
After an assessment mission in June 2015, the SPLM-N successfully neutralized 211 
stockpiled AP mines with the help of a Geneva Call expert in November 2015. Fred Meylan, 
Geneva Call’s Programme Director for Africa, reiterated the importance of destroying the full of 
AP mines stock to fulfill the Deed (Geneva Call 2015c). After several months of dialogue and 
preparations, the SPLM-N signed the Deed protecting children in armed conflict in June 2015 
becoming the first African NSAG to do so (Geneva Call 2015b). Meetings with other members of 
the SRF was complicated due to restricted access and little monitoring could take place, even by 
third parties. Nevertheless, Geneva Call carried out workshops for civil and community based 
organizations in Blue Nile informing them on humanitarian norms and the Deeds of Commitment 
(Geneva Call 2016a). Building local monitoring and advocacy capacity is part of the NGO mission.  
Using ‘Fighter Not Killer’ material, Geneva Call representatives explain basic IHL 
provisions and the Deeds to 30 SPLM-N officers and fighters in Blue Nile in April 2016. Despite 
the signing of Deed on the protection of children, implementation seems to be difficult as NSAG 
claim difficulties in evaluating the age of the recruits. Age checking process in camps and at the 
frontline have been encouraged by the NGO. An AP mine stockpile remained to be neutralized in 
the region (Geneva Call 2016b). In October, European representatives of the SPLM-N were given 
detailed training on IHL and methods of implementation for the field. Geneva Call tries to maintain 
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a high level of understanding of IHL in the rebel group by engaging the group at different levels 
(Geneva Call 2016c).  
 
4.3 NSAGs’ compliance with international norms 
 
Answering the research question requires to determine whether Geneva Call activities have 
improved NSAGs’ compliance to international norms. Lack of precise data renders this task 
difficult, but I will nevertheless provide some elements of answer.  
 Geneva Call was originally created to combat the use of AP mines, and works towards 
eliminating their use by NSAGs. The Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor has long reported 
the presence and use of AP mines in Sudan, which is a signatory to the Ottawa Convention. Reports 
in 2010 confirms the use of mines by rebel and government forces. The SPLM-N allegedly used 
mines (whether AP or AV is unclear) in its fight against the government in South Kordofan. Sudan 
has one of the highest ratio of child casualties at 58% of civilians victims (Mines Action Canada 
2011). In 2011, the UN reports that the SPLM-N laid out mines around Kadugli, the South 
Kordofan state capital. The SPLM-N is reported to capture stocks of mines from government 
forces, notably in Toroji (Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2012). In the summer of 2012, 
JEM along with the SPLM-N seized mines after capturing a SAF base in Heglig, however JEM 
declared not having taken any mines, considering them dangerous and of no use. Mines seem to 
be easily available in a black market in Sudan with South Kordofan and Blue Nile being heavily 
contaminated (International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-
CMC) 2013). Mine casualties increased rapidly in 2011 with the intensification of hostilities in the 
Two Areas. Children were particularly affected, representing 61% of civilian victims in 2012. 
However, a significant change occurred in 2013 with a net decrease in casualties: from 109 in 2012 
to just 30 in 2013. This coincides with the SPLM-N signing the Deed banning AP mines.  
 On the issue of child soldiers, all four NSAGs operating in Sudan are listed in the Secretary-
General report as recruiting and using children in combat from 2010 to 2016. However, some 
changes in behavior can be observed. Since 2010, reported cases of child soldiers in Darfur have 
considerably decreased, from 115 in 2010 to less than 10 in 2015. Yet, as the conflict in South 
Kordofan and Blue Nile picks up in 2011 and 2012, we observe a sharp increase in recruitment of 
children for armed action. From eight cases in 2010, it jumps to 125 cases in 2012, with most 
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recruits joining the SPLM-N and JEM. JEM is reported to have consistently recruited Nuba 
children, causing tensions with its ally, the SPLM-N (De Alessi 2015). The following years, 
recruits decrease again, perhaps due to increase engagement from international organizations such 
as the UN and Geneva Call. A joint political statement was signed by the SLA factions and JEM, 
while the SPLM-N committed to the Deed protecting children (UN Secretary-General (UNSG) 
2016). In addition, this ‘back or white’ UN mechanism does not offer a nuanced view as one 
violation suffice to be listed as a violator.  
 In the absence of precise data, NSAG overall compliance with international norms is 
difficult to quantify. Active hostilities often prevent international actors to access and monitor 
conflict areas. In addition, all actors, government included, have an interest in hiding as much as 
possible violations of such norms. What is certain is that rebel groups do violate international 
norms as the following few examples will show. In a retaliatory attack against government held-
areas in October 2012, the SPLM-N shelled Kadugli’s market leaving at least six dead and several 
injured (IRIN News 2017). Moreover, attacks from the SPLM-N in March 2015 in Kalogi town 
killed 27 civilians and displaced over 20,000 with reports that no opponents’ military forces were 
present (Amnesty International 2015). The fundamental provision of IHL is the distinction 
between combatants and civilians but rebel groups have targeted civilians thought to support 
government forces (Asylum Research Consultancy 2016; Bellal, Genève, and Casey-Maslen 
2011). Supporting the rebellion in South Kordofan, JEM and SLA factions operated in the region 
between 2011 and 2014. Accused of repeated abuses against civilians, such as looting, rape and 
forced recruitment, the SPLM-N asked them to leave (Human Security Baseline Assessment 
(HSBA) 2015).  
 
5 Findings and analysis 
 
The case study did not reveal a clear and identifiable causal link between Geneva Call 
engagement with rebel groups in Sudan and an increase of their compliance with international 
norms, expected due to the lack of comprehensive data. Yet, the depiction of the case study brings 
several findings relevant to the research question.  
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 First, humanitarian engagement proved to be possible, with clear proof that rebel groups 
are willing to talk on international norms and improve their adherence to a more humane form of 
warfare. Humanitarian engagement by Geneva Call aims at fostering rebel group’s understanding 
and compliance with those norms. Strategic argumentation, a form of informational diffusion, is 
used wisely to convince NSAGs to sign Deeds. A case in point is that all four rebel groups signed 
the Deed banning AP mines by 2014, and the SPLM-N signed the one on the protection of children. 
As an NGO, Geneva Call interact in an unofficial capacity or Track Two negotiations making it 
easier to discuss sensitive and tense issues. In contrast to state actors or the UN, NGOs can act as 
an independent and impartial norm entrepreneur (Krieger 2013). 
Second, the incremental process employed by Geneva Call seems to bring tangible results. 
Multiple entry points regarding various norms allows for more flexibility when interacting with 
rebel groups (Somer 2012). JEM was first engaged on the AP mine ban rather than on child 
soldiers, despite the relatively low usage of mines by the group. This first entry point allowed 
Geneva Call to advocate other norms once a relationship was built. It is particularly intuitive to 
add a provision in the Deeds, committing the groups to take further action on wider international 
norms, notably IHL and HRL. Moreover, the NGO rightly understood contextual factors and rebel 
groups own views on the issue. The ‘In their Words’ studies show the other side of the coin, adding 
perspectives of rebel groups on humanitarian issues such as child protection and humanitarian 
access. As a point of comparison, if Geneva Call had used naming and shaming techniques from 
the outset, it is likely that no relationships could have been built and ties broken off rapidly making 
improvements impossible. For instance, Geneva Call kept talking with the SPLM-N in 2012 
despite denying possessing AP mines. They eventually signed the Deed the following year. 
Engaging in slow confidence building measures benefits in the long term. 
 Third, an unexpected side-effect of the engagement with rebels in Sudan was ‘engagement 
spill-over’, whereby interacting with one rebel group lead to a willingness of other groups to 
interact. JEM was key in introducing other allied rebel groups to Geneva Call, certainly possible 
thanks to the mutual trust and understanding of both actors. However, the expansion may not have 
been possible without a good relationship or if rebel groups did not have particular ties with other 
rebel groups. JEM formed a rebel alliance with the SPLM-N and SLA factions and introduced the 
work of Geneva Call to other rebel leaders. The NGO is also able to exploit astutely the alliance 
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dynamics to offer joint training sessions making use of peer pressure among rebels to increase 
compliance. No one wants to be the ‘black sheep’ of the family.  
Geneva Call leverages existing relations based on trust and often years of interactions to widen the 
scope of engagement over time. Organizations that engage NSAGs  progressively earn the right to 
be heard (Somer 2012). 
 Fourth, the Deeds make NSAGs own the rules, where the inclusive approach give them an 
opportunity to adhere to norms and be held accountable for their commitment. Rather than 
imposing rules and treaties they are not allowed to sign, Geneva Call created a formal instrument, 
the Deeds, to partly solve this ownership problem. It is also clearly stated that NSAGs will not 
alter their legal status by signing the Deeds. As a Deed signatory, it becomes harder to justify 
violations of the norms the group voluntarily pledged to respect. Again, it gives Geneva Call and 
other actors strategic argumentative power in future talks allowing to progress in other areas of 
compliance with international norms. Besides, the Deeds are a form of procedural diffusion since 
it establishes longer term relations via a legal document. 
 Fifth, the development of simple and culturally relevant educational material can help 
ensure the assimilation of norms by rebel fighters (International Institute of Humanitarian Law 
2014). Geneva Call comprehended this challenge by using pedagogical methods and material 
during trainings, fitting the audience they were addressing. This transference is illustrated by the 
‘Fighter Not Killer’ content, which was useful in addressing fighters with low education level since 
it presented the norms with the support of interactive videos, pictures and scenarios in a language 
they could understand. For commanders or political leaders, trainings were adapted to transmit 
more detailed information and how to transfer it to lower rank fighters. Multiple trainings have 
shown interest from rebel participants in learning more about international norms, which was 
possible thanks to technical experts and humanitarian professionals from Geneva Call.  
 Improving compliance requires implementation plans after the signing of unilateral 
declarations. Trainings and workshops are one tool utilized by Geneva Call but modification of 
the internal code of conduct of rebel organizations and monitoring and reporting mechanisms also 
contribute to the implementation of the Deeds. A code of conduct define the NSAG’s identity and 
give a sense of the group’s structure, aims, weaknesses and respect of international norms  
(Bangerter 2012). In Sudan, the JEM successfully modified its code of conduct to reflect changes 
in norms after signing the Deed. Moreover, Deeds force rebel groups to accept monitoring and 
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reporting mechanisms of three types: self-reporting, third party monitoring and Geneva Call field 
missions. While appearing unintelligent at first glance, voluntary reporting actually imposes a form 
of self-reflection on the rebel group’s behavior, which turns into better assimilation and realization 
of the rules. Third-party monitoring allows for cross-checking information and potential violations, 
while being cost-efficient for Geneva Call. Indeed, field missions bring the best monitoring quality 
but have high-costs and are sometimes impossible to undertake when security conditions are too 
dangerous. In Sudan, rebel groups have accepted to report on their activities and allowed Geneva 
Call to intervene in areas under their control.  
 Finally, the rebels engaged have the particularity of being politically ambitious, with the 
development of political agendas and platforms challenging the rule of the state. The SRF is more 
than a military alliance and does have political objectives, that is overthrowing the Khartoum 
government to establish a secular and decentralized state (McCutchen 2014). Jo’s theory of 
compliant rebels seems to fit the case of Sudanese rebels. Indeed, legitimacy is an important factor 
for members of the SRF alliance. On the one hand, the rebel groups seek to gain and maintain 
popular support in their respective home bases. The inclusion of local civil society organizations 
and the publicity of signing the Deeds can help convince people of lending the rebels support. On 
the other hand, they require foreign support and recognition. Using this window of engagement, 
Geneva Call give, to some extent, international legitimacy thanks to its reputation as a Swiss, 
independent and neutral organization (Krieger 2013). In both cases, rebel groups need to 
demonstrate a better behavior than the government they are fighting.  
	
6 Limitations and challenges 
 
 The case study also revealed challenges and limitations, constraining Geneva Call’s 
engagement and activities. As a matter of fact, many NSAGs are still reluctant to commit to norms 
that does not bring clear benefits. Mines for example are frequently used by armed groups to make 
Improvised Explosive Devices, used in ambushes and guerrilla style combat. It is often the case, 
due to the asymmetry of weapons, that rebels would employ mines and other means that come 
cheaper to them (Sjöberg 2006). UN processes, for instance the annual report on child soldiers, are 
often not understood by NSAGs, which are usually not informed and unable to justify their actions 
(International Institute of Humanitarian Law 2014). Moreover, Geneva Call sometimes has to 
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accept half-measures as part of the incremental approach. From a very principled and ethical point 
of view, it may not seem ideal to compromise on the full respect of international norms. The 
reasoning of Geneva Call consists of accepting that small improvements are better than no 
improvements at all.  
Next, security concerns can limit the access of Geneva Call and its partners to areas 
controlled by NSAGs. In Sudan, rebel groups did not pose serious challenges to Geneva Call visits. 
Nevertheless, renewed hostilities and a deteriorating security situation prevented at several 
occasions, NGO representatives to carry out activities. It is sometimes too dangerous for personnel 
to visit frontlines where most fighters and weapons are located. Mines presumably stockpiled in 
Blue Nile were not destroyed due to access constraints. 
Problem of implementation do exist and we have seen that signing the Deeds does not equal full 
compliance (at least in the short term). Group divisions and a weak chain of command are often 
mentioned as being impeding factors to proper implementation (International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law 2014). For example, the SLA-AW leader flew in exile to Paris after 2006 and 
had a more limited control over its troops on the battlefield.  However, engagement at different 
levels or with local civil society surrounding rebel groups can mitigate those risks. 
Resource constraints also limits the field of action of Geneva Call. It remains a small NGO 
with funds of about 4 million Swiss francs per year. In comparison, Oxfam reported income of 
over a billion euros in 2015. Implementation is fairly impacted by the lack of resources and donors 
are reticent to fund operations under NSAG control (Call 2007). Geneva Call is largely dependent 
on institutional funders such as United Kingdom, France, Sweden or the European Commission. 
Field missions are time and money consuming but also likely to foster implementation of the Deeds 
and improve overall compliance of rebel groups.  
 
7 Implications for policy-making 
 
Two school of thought are opposing each other. Some believe that NSAGs are part of the 
problem, causing harm and devastation when they operate. Given the state-centric system, they 
argue for minimal engagement, with preferred options such as military interventions, peacekeeping 
or economic sanctions (Jo 2015). Others regard NSAGs as part of the solution in which rebel 
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groups can be convinced to comply with international norms. Geneva Call belongs to the latter, 
making it their mission to influence NSAGs with an inclusive rather than a punitive approach. As 
mentioned in the introduction and seen during the case study, rebels are massive perpetrators of 
violence and policy-makers have an interest in reducing the level of violence, specifically against 
the most vulnerable.  
 First and foremost, the analysis of rebel groups in Sudan demonstrate that humanitarian 
engagement is possible and that NSAGs are willing to improve their conduct in regards to 
international norms. Therefore, policy-makers should exploit this opportunity to reduce the 
violence in civil war, especially against civilian’s populations, by engaging rebel groups. 
Understanding rebel groups’ incentives, it is possible to strategically argue for the respect of 
norms, humanitarian access or ceasefires. This can be a short and long term objective as 
implementation of new rules is likely to differ depending on the context. Different types of 
engagement exist, but findings of my analysis are most relevant for humanitarian actors. Indeed, 
Geneva Call experience can enlighten others to improve humanitarian objectives.  
 Second, humanitarians should consider the importance of building trust, via confidence 
building measures, to allow a more positive and prolonged dialogue. Geneva Call’s experience 
shows short-term concessions can bring longer term results. In addition, a large network of 
contacts can be beneficial as the conflict dynamics change on the ground. Rebel leaders can be 
dismissed or killed and multiple contacts keep the relationship alive. The question of ownership is 
equally important as NSAGs prefer inclusion than imposition. Including rebel groups in the 
drafting process of documents should improve its adherence. Moreover, humanitarian actors 
should carefully consider tailored approach and investigate the context and the origin of the rebel 
group they wish to engage. It is unlikely that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ method can be applied given the 
diversity of NSAG.  
 Finally, Geneva Call and other humanitarians are often restricted by limited government 
funding to interact with NSAGs. Furthermore, states often designate NSAGs as ‘terrorists’, leading 
to serious legal consequences for humanitarians that engage them. Such label and criminalization 
will likely impede compliance efforts and encourage rebel groups to violate norms (Bellal and 
Casey-Maslen 2011). Indeed, US law forbid the provision of material assistance (this include 
training and education material on international norms) to a terrorist group, making it impossible 
for some NGOs to train NSAGs (Norwegian Refugee Council 2015; Roberts and Sivakumaran 
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2012). Better coordination among humanitarian groups can mitigate the risks and avoid situations 
where they are accused of aiding terrorist organizations. Otherwise, a perverse tend, where actors 
will engage in the dark, is likely to become prevalent. Policy-makers and researchers need better 
information and data to learn from collective experiences (Jo 2015). 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
Despite the chaos and brutality of Sudan’s peripheral conflicts, humanitarian engagement, 
specifically via norm diffusion mechanisms, can be considered as a positive tool to enhance 
international norms compliance of NSAGs. In its operations with Sudanese rebel groups, Geneva 
Call has shown that constructive engagement on norms is possible, bringing several findings of 
interest. Seeking a form of legitimacy and wishing to appear as a credible challenge to the rule of 
the state, NSAGs are opening the door for international actors willing to talk to them. Geneva Call, 
a Swiss, independent and impartial organization, exploits this opportunity by promoting greater 
respect of international norms. Rebels may not feel compelled to respect international norms they 
could not participate in making or adhere to. Geneva Call’s inclusive method partly resolves this 
ownership dilemma, whereby NSAGs can voluntary commit and sign legal documents on 
international norms. In other words, the innovation of the Deed resides in publically binding 
NSAGs that are unable to participate in international state treaties and lawmaking. Besides, 
Geneva Call grasped that NSAGs may not become full compliant at once. Consequently, they 
chose to adopt a step by step process building relationships and trust to achieve incremental results 
over time. Geneva Call did not name and shame rebel groups in Sudan, despite their non-
compliance on several issues. Rather, confidence-building measures during dialogues were 
employed to convince rebels to sign Deeds. Moreover, the approach also permits to grow the 
possibilities of engagement: a spill-over occurred after initial fruitful meetings with JEM that 
encouraged other Sudanese rebels to interact with the NGO. Looking back at the norm diffusion 
scholarship, Geneva Call make use of information, procedural diffusion and transference to 
increase compliant behaviors. Strategic argumentation requires a deep and thorough 
comprehension of conflict dynamics and rebels’ characteristics to maximize one’s chance of 
persuading a rebel group to adapt its conduct. The Deed is a form of procedural diffusion as it 
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establishes, through he medium of a legal document, a long-term relationship between Geneva 
Call and the signatory rebel group. Clever education material and techniques, adapted to the 
audience, transfer effectively knowledge and skills to rebels in order to implement behavioral 
change. Yet, implementation of the Deeds’ provisions remains challenging as security conditions 
or limited resources prevent Geneva Call and its partners to optimally do their work. The 
involvement of local civil society actors and third-parties in the field aims at mitigating those 
implementation hurdles.  
 Giving a clear answer to the research question revealed itself to be difficult. Indeed, the 
lack of precise and consistent data on the behavior of rebel groups in Sudan did not allow me to 
demonstrate identifiable causal links. Nevertheless, the study of Geneva Call in Sudan offers 
effective mechanisms of humanitarian engagement with rebel groups as mentioned in the previous 
paragraph. Geneva Call was fairly effective at improving compliance with international in its 
involvement with NSAGs. All armed groups engaged signed the Deed banning AP mines, and 
engagement on child soldiers, sexual abuses and IHL in general continues. In addition, the SPLM-
N did sign the Deed on the protection of children. It remains to see if implementation is successful 
and in what timeframe. The analysis accomplished should give ground for future research to 
explore some of the effective tools in detail and across different countries. This field of research 
is at its earliest stage but will need to be further developed to grasp the contemporary challenge of 
NSAGs. If IHL and HRL is to be enforced, there is no other way than to engage armed groups. 
Policy-makers should consider the experience of Geneva Call to engage themselves with rebel 
groups or at least provide sufficient funding to such organizations so that the human cost of civil 
wars is diminished. 
It does not mean that it is the unique approach to improve compliance of NSAGs with 
international norms, further studies on different modes of engagement, whether through public 
policy, conflict resolution or even aid provision, could be the tools to compare and contrast, 
allowing greater perspectives. In addition, researchers and organizations should improve the data 
available to measure the compliance of NSAGs. After all, it may be the only way to determine 
precisely the causal effects between modes of engagement and compliant behaviors. 
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9 Annexes: Maps 
 
9.1 Map of Sudan 
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9.2 Map of Darfur 
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9.3 Map of South Kordofan 
	
	
	
	 	
	 39	
	
9.4 Map of Blue Nile 
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